Privacy-preserving string equality test is a fundamental operation of many algorithms, including privacy-preserving authentication in Internet of Things (IoT). Existing secure equality test schemes can theoretically achieve string equality comparison and preserve the private strings. However, they suffer from heavy computation and communication cost, especially while the strings are of hundreds of bits or longer, which is not suitable for IoT applications. In this paper, we propose an approximate Fast privacypreserving equality Test Protocol (FTP), which can securely complete string equality test and achieve high running efficiency at the cost of little accuracy loss. We strictly analyze the accuracy of our proposed scheme and formally prove its security. Additionally, we leverage extensive simulation experiments to evaluate the running cost, which confirms our high efficiency; for instance, our proposed FTP can securely compare two 256-bit strings within 0.7 seconds on ordinary laptops.
Introduction
In recent years, with the growth of privacy concern, privacypreserving computation [1] [2] [3] [4] receives increasing attention, since various privacy-preserving computation schemes can support computation on private data while keeping the privacy of the involved data. Sensitive data collection and analysis over the encrypted data become the current trend [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Based on this situation, Privacy-preserving Equality Test (PET) aims at securely comparing two binary strings which are privately held by two parties. That is, by PET scheme, two participants can securely work out whether their binary strings are exactly equal or not; meanwhile each participant can obtain no useful information about the private binary string of the other participant; even two strings are the same. PET is a significant basic building of many privacy-preserving schemes, such as privacy-preserving authentication [13] [14] [15] , secure comparison of biological characteristics [16] [17] [18] , privacy-preserving machine learning [19] [20] [21] , secure cost comparison in wireless network [22, 23] , privacy-preserving threshold schema in recommendation systems [3] , attribute comparison in attribute-based encryption [24] [25] [26] , and secure query in cloud [27, 28] . For example, Internet-ofThings (IoT) applications may authenticate users in privacypreserving manner. For completing the authentication, a user needs to submit his/her authentication credential to IoT system, and the system decides whether the user is legal or not by comparing the user's authentication credential with authentication information stored in the system database. As privacy concern, the user cannot reveal his/her authentication credential to the system, and the latter can just access them in encrypted form. Meanwhile, to protect the privacy of the IoT system, any user cannot learn useful information of database stored in the IoT system. This dilemmatic problem can be solved by employing a PET protocol.
As its wide applications, several works have devoted to PET recently. Nateghizad et al. 's scheme [29] , denoted as NEL16, is the state-of-the-art approach to achieve PET, which is also the most efficient PET method up to now. NEL16 can be viewed as an improved method of Lipmaa and Toft's PET scheme in [30] denoted as LT13. In LT13 [30] , Lipmaa and Toft compute the Hamming distance of two private binary strings in encrypted form. Then, they generate a Lagrange interpolating polynomial that outputs 0 if the input equals 0 and outputs 1 otherwise. Finally, the comparison result is figured out in encrypted form by securely evaluating the Lagrange interpolating polynomial with encrypted Hamming distance as input. Compared to LT13, NEL16 further computes the number of "1" of binary representation of the Hamming distance in encrypted form and uses the number of "1", instead of the Hamming distance, to evaluate the Lagrange interpolating polynomial. Suppose binary representation of the Hamming distance has bits. The number of "1" must be not bigger than , which can be represented by using just ⌈log 2 ⌉ bits. While ⩾ 2, it always has > ⌈log 2 ⌉. Thus, NEL16 requires a lower-degree Lagrange polynomial and can reduce running time. However, NEL16 still cannot achieve practical running efficiency, since computing the number of "1" in encrypted form is also timeconsuming. As shown in [29] , while implementing them on a Linux machine of 64-bit microprocessor and 8 GB RAM to compare two 256-bit binary strings, LT13 and NEL16 both cost tens of seconds. Therefore, existing PET schemes still suffer from low efficiency.
In this paper, we propose a new PET scheme, named Fast privacy-preserving equality Test Protocol (FTP), which has high efficiency at the cost of little error rates. In FTP, we randomly convert the original binary strings into shorter ones, then the shorter binary strings are securely compared to decide whether the original ones are the same, by which we can dramatically reduce both computation cost and communication overheads. Although FTP just compares shorter strings, we can ensure the comparison result is exactly correct if the original binary strings are the same or they have an odd number of different bits, and the comparison result has low false-positive rates while they have an even number of different bits. For data privacy, our proposed FTP can achieve provable security, and no private information is disclosed throughout the protocol. In general, our main contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:
(i) We propose a Fast privacy-preserving equality Test Protocol, named FTP, which can achieve much high running efficiency than the state-of-the-art PET schemes. FTP can guarantee an exactly correct comparison result while the involved binary strings are the same or have an odd number of different bits and has a low false-positive rate if the compared strings have an even number of different bits.
(ii) We formally prove the security of FTP and can guarantee no privacy is disclosed throughout the proposed protocol.
(iii) We strictly analyze the accuracy loss of FTP and leverage extensive experiments to evaluate the running cost. The results indicate that FTP is highly accurate and can dramatically reduce running cost.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe preliminaries and system model. In Section 3, we present our approximate fast privacy-preserving equality test in detail and theoretically analyze its accuracy loss. In Section 4, we formally prove the security of our scheme, evaluate our running efficiency, and compare our scheme with previous ones. In Section 5, we simply review the related work. At last, we conclude this paper in Section 6.
System Model and Preliminaries
2.1. Paillier Encryption System. In [31] , Paillier proposes a probabilistic public key encryption scheme with semantic security (Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack, IND-CPA). Its steps are concisely described as follows.
Key Generation. Select two large enough primes and . Then, the secret key is = lcm( − 1, − 1), i.e., the least common multiple of −1 and −1. The public key is ( , ), where = and ∈ Z * 2 such that gcd(L( mod 2 ), ) = 1, that is, the maximal common divisor of L( mod 2 ), and equals 1. Here, L( ) = ( − 1)/ .
Encryption. Let 0 be a number in plaintext space Z . Select a random ∈ Z * as the secret parameter, then the
In Paillier encryption system, it obviously has
where E ( , ) denotes the encrypted result of using public key and random secret parameter . That is, the product of ciphertexts of 1 and 2 is a ciphertext of 1 + 2 . Thus, Paillier encryption scheme is additively homomorphic. Further, for any ∈ Z , there is
i.e., the -th power of E ( , ) is a ciphertext of * . Besides, Paillier cryptosystem has the self-blinding property as it is a probabilistic encryption. For any plaintext ∈ Z , it has E ( ,
Paillier encryption system is a significant secure basic tool of our scheme, which will be utilized to encrypt private data and support necessary computation. For simplicity, we use ⟦ ⟧ to denote the ciphertext of encrypted by Paillier cryptosystem, while the random parameter is no need to be pointed out.
System Model.
In this paper, we consider privacypreserving user authentication in IoT. A user (named Bob) submits a -bit authentication credential to system (named Alice), and the system decides whether the user is legal or not by comparing Bob's authentication credential with the authentication information stored in the system database.
As privacy concern, Bob cannot reveal the authentication credential and authentication result to Alice, and Alice just obtains them in encrypted form. Meanwhile, to protect the privacy of Alice, Bob cannot learn any information of Alice's database. This dilemmatic problem can be seen as a privacypreserving equality test (PET) problem as follows.
Privacy-Preserving Equality Test (PET) Problem. PET involves two parties: Alice and Bob. Alice privately hold -bit binary strings = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) and Bob = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ). Here, and can be also considered as two integers that belong to [0, 2 − 1]. Besides, Bob has a public key pair ( , ) of Paillier encryption system, where is public key and is secret key. They want to securely compare and such that only Alice obtains the comparison result in encrypted form; i.e., Alice gains ⟦ ⟧ in which
Additionally, should be privately kept to Alice throughout the protocol, and Bob's private string cannot be disclosed to Alice or anybody else. Neither Alice nor Bob can learn the real value of .
Security Model.
In this paper, we assume that the participants Alice and Bob are semihonest. It means that each participant follows the protocol correctly but records all the received information in the protocol to infer as much information about the private data of the other participant as possible. In [32] , Goldreich gives a formal definition of security against semihonest adversaries, which can be described as follows.
Definition 1 (privacy under semi-honest model [32] ). Let ( , ) be a functionality and 1 ( , ) (resp. 2 ( , )) denote the first (resp., second) element of ( , ). Let Π be a twoparty protocol for computing ( , ) such that the first (resp., second) party obtains 1 ( , ) (resp., 2 ( , )). The view of the first (resp., second) party during an execution of Π on ( , ), denoted as 1 ( , ) (resp., 2 ( , )), is ( , , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) (resp., ( , , 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , )), where (resp., ) represents the input of the first (resp., second) party, represents its random number, and represents the -th message it has received. We say that protocol Π privately computes function , i.e., Π is secure against semihonest adversaries, if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms 1 and 2 , such that
where ≡ represents computational indistinguishability.
Design Goal.
For PET problem shown in Section 2.2, we aim at proposing a new solution to achieve the following security and performance goals.
(i) High Accuracy. The protocol should arrive at a correct output with high probability while both participants exactly follow the protocol steps. That is, the solution should be of high accuracy to output a correct comparison result.
(ii) Input Privacy. Throughout the protocol, each bit of the private inputs and should be known to its owner only. That it, any useful information about cannot be disclosed to Bob, and cannot be revealed to Alice.
(iii) Result Privacy. Both users cannot get the value of result in plaintext, and only Alice can obtain the encrypted output ⟦ ⟧ which is encrypted by Bob's public key.
(iv) Efficiency. The protocol needs to employ a sublinear number of public key encryption and decryption such that it can achieve high running efficiency even while and are of hundreds of bits.
Review of LT13 Scheme.
In this following, we will simply introduce the previous PET schemes LT13 [30] . Generally, LT13 consists of two stages: (1) Computing the encrypted Hamming distance ⟦ ⟧ between and such that only Alice learns ⟦ ⟧. During the first stage, Bob uses the public key to encrypt his private bit for = 1 to and sends each ⟦ ⟧ to Alice. Then, based on (7) and the additively homomorphic property of Paillier encryption scheme,
Alice can obtain the encrypted Hamming distance
(2) Computing the final result ⟦ ⟧ which is also known to Alice only. To this end, they first select a -degree public Lagrange interpolation polynomial ( ) = ∑ =0 that satisfies (1) = 1, (2) = (3) = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ( + 1) = 0.
Namely, we can correctly attain the output by setting = ( + 1), since 0 ⩽ ⩽ . Second, Alice sets ⟦ ⟧ = ⟦ ⟧ * ⟦1⟧, i.e., = + 1, and ⟦ ⟧ = ⟦ ⟧ where = −1 mod , is randomly selected from Z * , and is the large integer in the public key. After that, ⟦ ⟧ will be sent to Bob, who decrypts , encrypts , and returns the ciphertext ⟦ ⟧ to Alice for = 2, 3, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , . Finally, Alice can gain ⟦ ⟧ = ⟦ ⟧ and ⟦ ( )⟧ = ⟦ 0 ⟧ * ⟦ ⟧ 1 * ∏ =2 ⟦ ⟧, which is exactly ⟦ ⟧ because = ( + 1) = ( ).
As can be seen, for a larger , LT13 needs more computation and communication cost. While = 256, LT13 uses tens of seconds [29] , which is far away from being practical. In this paper, we will introduce a new PET scheme which can reduce the number of invoking Paillier encryption system and thus dramatically lessen running cost at the expense of small accuracy loss.
Privacy-Preserving Equality Test
2 , we have the following observations. Here, we use Δ to denote the number of different bits of and . It is easy to say 0 ⩽ Δ ⩽ .
Observation 1. If = , theñalways equals 0.
Proof. While = , each − equals 0; thus̃≡ 0.
Observation 2.
If ̸ = and Δ is odd, then it must bẽ̸ = 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume the first Δ bits of and are different from each other. That is, ̸ = for = 1 to Δ , and = for = Δ + 1 to .
In this case, ( − ) 2 = 1 for = 1 to Δ and ( − ) 2 = 0
, in which each ∈ {1, −1}. Since Δ is odd, the number of = 1 is impossibly equal to that of = −1.
Therefore, it must bẽ= ∑ Δ =1 ̸ = 0, which completes the proof.
and Δ is even, suppose Δ = 2 (obviously,0 < ⩽ ⌊ /2⌋), theñ= 0 with the probability (2 )!/(4 * ( !)
2 ), and correspondinglỹ̸ = 0 with the probability (1 − (2 )!/(4 * ( !) 2 )).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that ̸ = for = 1 to 2 and = for = 2 + 1 to . Then, ( − ) 2 = 1 for = 1 to 2 and ( − ) 2 = 0 for = 2 + 1 to . Further, we havẽ= ∑ 2 =1 . Let 1 , −1 denote the number of = 1, = −1, respectively, for = 1 to 2 . Then,̃= 1 − −1 . Hence, = 0 iff 1 = −1 . As is uniformly randomly selected from {1, −1}, the probability of 1 = −1 is ( 2 ) /2 2 , where
Then, the probability of̸̃ = 0 is
. Accordingly, the probability of
It completes the proof.
Observations 1, 2, and 3 show we can approximatively determine = by comparing̃and 0. Besides, we havẽ
since 2 = and 2 = . Then, we can get an approximative scheme for securely comparing and with high efficiency as follows.
Basic Approach. Alice selects numbers ∈ {1,−1} uniformly at random and computes = ∑ =1 . Then, Alice sets a -bit binary vector = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) where = 1 if (2 − 1) = 1 and = 0 otherwise and sends to Bob. While receiving , Bob can locally compute = ∑ =1 (2 − 1) . Finally, Alice and Bob utilize LT13 [30] to securely compare private numbers and such that Alice gains ⟦ = ⟧, i.e., Alice obtains ⟦1⟧ if = and ⟦0⟧ otherwise.
As ∈ {0, 1}, it has (2 − 1) ∈ {1, −1} and (2 − 1) ∈ {1, −1}. For the security Bob cannot learn any information about from , because is uniformly randomly selected from {1, −1}. Since 2 − 1 = (2 − 1), thus = ∑ =1 (2 − 1) = ∑ =1 ( (2 − 1) ) . Hence,̃= 0 iff = . That is, the basic scheme substantially determines = by checking = 0. We will analyze accuracy of the basic approach in Theorem 2.
Due to | |, | | ⩽ ; thus and can be represented by using ⌈log 2 ⌉+1 bits, in which ⌈log 2 ⌉ bits represent the value of | |, | | and one bit is used to denote their sign. While ⩾ 4, it always is ⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1 < . For example, when = 256, we have ⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1 = 9. Therefore, our basic scheme can dramatically reduce the running cost. 
To simplify, we use 0 to denote the probability Pr(̃= 0 | ̸ = ), i.e., 0 = Pr(̃= 0 | ̸ = ).
Proof. (1) If
= , it always has̃= 0 according to Observation 1. As̃= − , then = holds. Thus, Alice will gain ⟦1⟧, i.e., the basic scheme will get an exactly correct result.
(2) If ̸ = , the correct result is ⟦0⟧. Thus, the basic will correctly complete the comparison only when ̸ = . According to (9), we have ̸ = iff̸̃ = 0. Hence, in this situation, the probability that the basic scheme returns a correct result equals the condition probability Pr(̸̃ = 0 | ̸ = ). Correspondingly, the basic scheme returns a false 
Observation 3 has shown Pr(̃= 0 | Δ = 2 ) = (2 )!/(4 * ( !)
2 ). As a result,
which completes the proof.
Theorem 3. Let the functions (), () be
where ⩾ 1, ⩾ 16, and and are integers. We have
(
1) ( ) > ( + 1) for any ⩾ 1, (2) if is even, then ( ) > ( + 1) and ( ) > ( + 2), (3) if is odd, then ( ) > ( + 2).
Proof.
(1) According to the setting, we have
Then,
Therefore, ( ) > ( + 1) holds.
(2) It is easy to say
If is even, assume = 2 * V, then V = ⌊ /2⌋ = ⌊( +1)/2⌋ and V + 1 = ⌊( + 2)/2⌋. Hence,
Besides,
Since
As a result, ( ) > ( + 1) and ( ) > ( + 2) both are proved.
(3) If is odd, assume = 2 * V + 1, then V = ⌊ /2⌋ and V + 1 = ⌊( + 2)/2⌋. Then,
Since ( + 2)/( + 1) < /( − 1), we have
That is,
Because V = ⌊( −1)/2⌋ and V+1 = ⌊( +1)/2⌋, it has ( +1) = ∑ 
Consequently, ( ) > ( + 2) is correct. It completes the proof.
As we can see, Pr(̃= 0 | ̸ = ) = ( ). Theorem 3 shows that Pr(̃= 0 | ̸ = ) has a downward trend, as increases. While = 16, the error probability 0 = Pr(̃= 0 | ̸ = ) = 0.146 which may be too high for real applications. . Then, Alice utilizes ⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1 bits to represent , , respectively. The first bit denotes the sign where 0 denotes positive and 1 denotes negative, and the latter ⌈log 2 ⌉ bits represents the their absolute value. Let = 2(⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1). We use = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) to denote the 2(⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1) bits of and , in which the first ⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1 bits correspond to , and the latter ⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1 bits correspond to . 4: Bob computes = ∑ =1 (2 − 1) and = ∑ =1 (2 − 1) . Then, Bob utilizes ⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1 bits to represent , , respectively.
The first bit denotes the sign where 0 denotes positive and 1 denotes negative, and the latter ⌈log 2 ⌉ bits represents the their absolute value. Similarly, = ( 1 , 2 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , ) is used to denote the 2(⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1) bits of and , in which the first ⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1 bits correspond to , and the latter ⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1 bits correspond to . 5: For = 1 to , Bob uses his public key to encrypt each private bit , and sends ⟦ ⟧ to Alice. : the error probability of using double and , while and are inequal.
We can reduce the probability by generating multiple and with different random vector , which can exponentially reduce the error probability. For example, if we use double and , then the error probability will be 2 0 . Even when = 16, the error probability will be 0.021 around. Figure 1 shows the error probability while ranges from 16 to 256. It indicates our error probability will be smaller than 1% while the bit length is larger than 42. When using our scheme to compare two 256-bit binary strings, the error probability will be about 0.21% only.
In general, the details of our scheme with double and are formally shown in Protocol 1. First, Alice randomly generates , ∈ {1, −1} and shares (2 − 1), (2 − 1) with Bob. Second, Alice locally computes = ∑ =1 and = ∑ =1
, and Bob gains = ∑ =1 (2 − 1) and = ∑ =1 (2 − 1) . They decide = iff = and = . Third, they use 2(⌈log 2 ⌉+1)-bit and to represent ( , ) and ( , ), respectively. Finally, Alice and Bob utilize the similar methods of LT13 to securely compare and such that Alice gains ⟦ = ⟧.
Analysis Evaluation
4.1. Security. We prove the security of our proposed scheme FTP through the following Theorem 4. Proof. We will discuss the view of Alice and Bob, respectively.
In our scheme FTP, Alice receives ⟦ ⟧, ⟦ ⟧ for = 1, 2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 2(⌈log 2 ⌉+1). Based on IND-CPA security of Paillier encryption system [31] , Alice can learn nothing useful about and . Thus, Bob's private data can be securely preserved. Throughout FTP, Bob learns just , , and . For each bit in , it has = 1 if (2 − 1) = 1; otherwise = 0. That is, (2 − 1) = (2 − 1) . Each ∈ {1, −1} is unknown to Bob, and we can simply assume Pr( = 1) = Pr( = 0) = 0.5 for the view of Bob. Hence, for any , conditional probability Pr( = 1 | ) = Pr( = 0 | ) = 0.5, which means Bob can learn nothing about from . Similarly, it is provable that discloses nothing about . For , based on the additive homomorphic property, we have = * −1 mod . As is randomly selected from Z * , Bob can infer no information about from . In general, , , and reveal nothing of Alice's private data.
To sum up, the privacy of Alice and Bob both can be preserved in our scheme FTP, which completes the proof.
Computation and Communication Cost.
In this section, we will analyze the computation complexity and communication overheads of our proposed FTP in detail.
Computation Complexity. Since simple addition and multiplication are much cheaper than encryption, decryption, and ciphertext multiplication of Paillier cryptosystem, we will ignore the simple addition and multiplication in the protocol. Throughout FTP, Bob encrypts each and for = 1 to 2(⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1) and decrypts one times to gain . Alice uses ⟦ ⟧ and ⟦ ⟧ to compute ⟦ ⟧ and ⟦ ⟧, which requires ciphertext multiplication 2(⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1) times. In total, both Bob and Alice just employ Paillier encryption system (log ) times.
Communication Overheads. In our scheme FTP, Alice and Bob need to transmit , , ⟦ ⟧ and ⟦ ⟧ for = 1 to 2(⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1). If each ciphertext is -bit, then the total communication overheads are 2 + 2 (⌈log 2 ⌉ + 1). While = 256 and we set the public key of Paillier encryption system to be 2048 bits, the communication overheads will be 37376 bits.
Experiment Results.
We implement our scheme and two existing efficient algorithms: LT13 and NEL16, using C language. During executing our scheme, we utilize GMP library [33] and Paillier library [34] with key size of 2048 bits. All experiments are performed on an Apple computer with macOS Sierra 10.12.6, Intel Core i5 1.6GHz CPU and 4 GB memory. Alice and Bob communicate through the socket where ping time is about 0.81 seconds. Figure 2 shows the runtime of LT13, NEL16, and our scheme FTP while the compared string is of 16 to 256 bits. As can be seen, FTP can dramatically reduce the running time compared to LT13 and NEL16. When the length is 256, LT13 costs about 25 seconds, NEL16 takes 6 seconds around, and FTP just needs 0.6 seconds. While the length is larger, the advantage of FTP will be more salient. The main reason is that we transform the original , into , which is much shorter than the original ones. More importantly, our transformation just involves simple addition and multiplication and can be completed rapidly. In FTP, Paillier encryption system is employed only to securely compare and . Therefore, FTP can reduce the running cost, especially when is large. If the bit length is smaller than 16, FTP has no significant advantages on running time, and LT13 or NEL16 is suitable for the short-string equality comparison scenario. 4.4. Improvement. Though our scheme FTP can reduce the cost, it still takes bits to transmit the vector or . We can further improve the scheme to avoid transmitting or . Let () : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} be a pseudorandom function. Alice and Bob, in advance, select a constant . While they decide to compare the private binary vectors, they can separately generate a random binary string ( ‖ ) where denotes the time they decide to implement the protocol and ‖ denotes concatenation. Then, they set = in which denotes the -th bit of ( ‖ ). Since = ( (2 − 1) + 1)/2 and (2 − 1) 2 = 1, Alice can locally get = (2 − 1)(2 − 1). Thus, Alice and Bob can compute and , respectively. By this method, Alice need not to send the vector again. For , they can preestablish another constant and use it avoid transmitting by a similar method.
Related Work
Privacy-preserving string equality test is one of secure multiparty computation (SMC) problems, and it has wide applications in various privacy-preserving scenes [35] [36] [37] [38] . Up to now, a big number of works can be utilized to achieve privacy-preserving string equality test. We simply discuss the previous schemes as follows. In 1982, Yao [39] proposes the first SMC problem, Millionaire problem and gives a secure solution. After that, garbled circuits method [32, 40] is put forward to securely evaluate a general function. Nevertheless, the general approach is too expensive and can just theoretically solve the problem. Scalar product protocol (also known as dot product protocol) focuses on computing the scalar product of two private vectors with privacy-preservation. Privacy-preserving string equality test can be achieved by invoking scalar product protocol. We thus review the main solutions of scalar product protocol. In [41] , Vaidya et al. proposed a scalar product protocol based on algebraic transformation. By using homomorphic encryption, two solutions for securely computing dot product of private vectors are given in [42] and [43] , respectively. A polynomial secret sharing-based scalar product protocol is presented by Shaneck and Kim [44] . Nevertheless, the schemes either are not provably secure or have heavy computation and communication overheads. Recently, Zhu et al. propose two efficient solutions for secure scalar product protocol [45, 46] , which can be utilized to securely compute the Hamming distance of two private strings but cannot support the distance comparison. Cheng et al. [47] review the approaches to secure Internet of Things in a quantum world. In [48] , Li et al. leverage Paillier encryption to achieve secure comparison protocol, based on which they also propose a secure SVM classification scheme. Nevertheless, the comparison scheme in [48] focuses on securely figuring out the bigger one from two private integers but cannot directly support the equality comparison problem investigated in this paper.
In [30] , Lipmaa and Toft propose a secure string equality test scheme based on Paillier encryption scheme [31] . While comparing -bit strings, Lipmaa and Toft's scheme requires ( ) encryption of Paillier encryption system and thus is time-consuming. Nateghizad et al. [29] improve Lipmaa and Toft's scheme by reducing the degree of Lagrange interpolation polynomial. As yet, the number of invoking Paillier encryption in Nateghizad et al. 's solution is also linear with , which is not suitable for a large either. In general, the existing privacy-preserving string equality test schemes are still far away from being practical.
Conclusions
In this paper, we considered efficient and privacy-preserving authentication in IoT applications. To this end, we proposed a new privacy-preserving equality test protocol, which can securely complete string equality test and achieve high running efficiency at the cost of little accuracy loss. We strictly analyzed the accuracy of our proposed scheme and formally proved our security. Additionally, we leveraged extensive simulation experiments to evaluate the running cost, which confirms our high efficiency.
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